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ABSTRACT
This paperadd resSeSthe qUCSLionof wilt'I herthe European
MonetarySystemcanbecopied outside Europe. Our answer is
negative. The EMS is just one element of a more comprehensive
designof institutional integration within Europe: the presence
of the European Economic Community, andthe dependenceof EEC
institutionsupon exchange rate stability lend credibility to EMS
exchangerate targets in a way that would not be present. say,
among the United States, Europe and Japan. The EMS has also
reproduced previous experiences of fixed exchange rates by not
imposing the exchange rate constraint symmetrically upon all
member countries: the system has de facto worked as a DM-zone,
thus confirming that the institution of fixed rates pg cannot
induce international nonetary cooperation. Finally, the
diferences in the use of the inflation tax among European
countries and the divergent behaviour of government debt after
1979 indicate that the pursuit of monetary convergence among
countries with different fiscal structures might entail
substantial fiscal reforms.
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1. Introduction
The European Monetary System () greeted with considerable
skepticims in 1978,is now enjoying remarkable popularity. The causes
of this shift in public opinion are plausibly to be found in the
experiencewith the the international onetarysystem in the two
periods: from 1971to 1978, and from1979to the present. The period
following thecollapse of the Bretton Woods system was characterized, in
Europe, byseveralattempts to limit exchange rate fluctuations,
represented by the experiments with the "snake'.Theseexperiments
provedto bea failure for the large "romance"countries:France and
Italy.The two countries made respectively two and one attempt to Join
the snake, which were definitely abandoned in 1976 and 1973. The
Belgian franc the Dutch guilder and the Deutsche mark, by contrast,
entered the snake in 1972 and never left ituntil the start of the ENS.
Thefailed attempts of France and Italy, and the suspicion that the
newtechnicalfeaturesthatcharacterizedthe ENSwouldlook more like
ginsiickrythan substantial reforms, justify the skepticims of observers
in 1978. On the other hand, during the most recent decade, the events
in the world financial markets have renewed and exhasperated the
dissatisfactionwith flexible exchange rates. The unprecedented swings
ofthe nominal and real dollar exchange rate,associatedwith a dramatic
worseningof the US current accountbalanceand the new position of the
US as thelargestdebtor in the world economy, have ledmanyobservers
tobelieve that there is something inherently unstable about flexible
exchange rates, and that it would be desirable to reform the
internationalmonetary system. Allthe main proposals for world3
monetary reform advocate, in a form or another, the limitation of
exchangerate flexibility.
In stark contrast with the gyrations of the dollar, European
currenciesand intra-Europeancompetitiveness indices have kept
relativelystable over the pasttenyears1; at the same time inflation
rates,andinflation-rate differentials across Europe,havebeen
dramatically reduced. Hencethe shift in the public opinion, and the
renewedinterest in the .Thispaperdiscusses some aspects ofthe
EMSexperience with the objective of helping to answer thequestion of
whetherthe E can be copied outside Europe.
The paper is organized around two main questions. The first is,
why is the aversion to exchange rate fluctuations stronger in Europe
than elsewehere? European countries are highly integrated and have
built institutions--the coninon market for agriculcural products in
particular-—that are dependent upon exchange rate stability. European
exchange rate stability is justified by a much broader,andmore
importanttrend towards economic unification, which in part transcends
purely economic motivations. Section 2 discusses the economic arid
historical justifications for limiting exchange—rate flexibility in
Europe,while section 3 reviews the working of the ENS exchange-rate
arrangements.
The secondquestionis: how does the EMS hold together' hat are
Animportant exception is the United Kingdom,thatremainedoutside
theEMS.4
the macroeconomic benefitsfrombelonging to the system?2 Itis often
statedthat joining thehas helped high inflation countries like
France and Italy to disinflate. Theoretical models suggest that such an
arrangement is desirable,for the inflation—prone countries, when the
nominalexchange rate target is more credible than money stock targets,
or interest rate targets. There is not, however, an accepted
explanation of why nominal exchange rate targets are more credible. The
explanation we propose is based on the claim that the exchange—rate
targets are a part of a broader agreement that includes the coixon
market, and theother coninunityinstitutions. Abandoning the EIS
targets is equivalent to abandoning this larger system. An additional
complication is that the the country exporting its reputation as an
"inflation fighter" tends to suffer, in the ENS, higher inflation than
itwouldotherwise.Sections4 and 5discuss the disinflation which
occurredafter the start of the ENS, and the stabilization of West
Germany'srealeffective exchange rate.
The achievement of monetaryconvergence,which can be creditedin
part to the ENS, has been reached atthe expenseofdivergent fiscal
performances.In section 6 we discuss the effects of the ENS on the
fiscal performances on the countries that joined it, while insection 7
we offer afew concluding remarks.
2Ideallythis question shouldbe answered byintegrating the analysis
ofthe informational benefits of a conunon currency (or fixed exchange
rates) with the analysis of the macroeconomic effects of alternative
exchange rate regimes. Unfortunately, the current models of money are
still ill-suited for such an ambitious task. Hence we concentrate
hereon the macroeconomicaspects.5
2.Why did Europeans setup the is?
Thecoordination of macroeconomic policies has a long tradition in
Europe: it dates back at least to the 1950s when six European countries
signed the Treaty of Rome. The izinediate effect of the Treaty was the
establishment of a customs union and of a corimon market for cereals——
later extended to all agricultural products. But its intentions were
much more ambitious. The Treaty lays down a set of principles for the
conduct of macroeconomic policy among its members: mutual consultations
in the area of short run macroeconomic policy; the cormnittment to
regard exchange rate policy as a matter of coninon interest"; and the
possibility of mutual assistance to overcome balance of payments crises.
The Monetary Coonittee of the European Coiauunities also dates back from
1958: its role was to promote the coordination of monetary policies, and
it was formed by two representatives for each country, one from the
Treasury, the other from the central bank.
Behind these early steps for policy coordination in Europe liesthe
specialEuropean aversion for exchange rate fluctuations. This aversion
is motivated by three factors. Thefirstis rooted in Europe's recent
history.In the 1920s and'30s many European countries had sought to
defendthemselves againstexternal shocks through competitive exchange
rate depreciations. Many inEurope today hold those policies responsible
forthe disruption of international trade and economic activity, and the6
ensuingcollapse of European democracies.Theexperience of the 1920s
and '30s is important to understand the postwar quest for exchangerate
stability which led to the Bretton Woods system.
Openness is the second explanation for the Europeandistaste for
exchange rate fluctuations. The EEC as a whole is not a particularly
open region——no more for example than the United States or Japan:the
share of imports in GDP was—-in 1987-—12.3 percent in the EEC, 10. 1
percent in the United States and 11.4 percent in Japan.Therefore there
is no particular reason why Europeans should worry about the
fluctuations of the ECU relative to the dollar or the yen—-no more at
least than Americans and Japanese worry about fluctuations of their own
currencies. But was is special in the EEC is that the region is not a
coimnon currency area. Individual countries have different currencies
and are also much more open than the region as a whole. Even before the
creation of the customs union the share of imports in GDP was as high as
40 percent in Belgium and the netherlands, 16 percent in Germany. The
trade creation and trade diversion effects of the union rapidly raised
these figures: now they are around 60—70 percent in the small northern
countries, and 25—30 percent in Germany, France, Italy and the UK.
Openness however is mostly an intra—European affair: thus, to the extent
that exchange rate fluctuations pose problems for an economy, it is the
fluctuation of intra-EEC exchange rates that Europeans view as
worrisome.
The memory of these events is kept alive by the Nurske's illuminating
account of the effects of the exchange rate policies of the 1920s.
SeeNurske (1944].7
The third explanation for the European aversion to exchange rate
fluctuations liesin the very institutions set up with the Treaty of
Rome, and in the coa.nonagriculturalmarket in particular. As we shall
now explain, the survivalof the coninon agricultural market depends upon
thest.abiity of intra-European exchange rates. Consider French and
German grains for example: they are almost perfect substitutes. Thus,
the "Law of One Price" for cereals should hold exactly. However input
prices in agriculture—-labour costs in particular--do not follow the
"Law of One Price": exchange rate realigneints could thus produce large
shifts in the profi t.abil i ty of the fanning sector across Europe, and
induce swings inagriculturaltrade in the region. The problem is
aggravated by the fact that across European agricultural markets the
"Law of One Price" rules by law. This is so because the European
Corrvnission regulates the cereals' market setting an EEC-wide price for
each product. The price is set in ECUs and translated in local
currencies at the ongoing exchange rate.
Europeans have agonizedon the difficulty of runninga comon
marketin a region that does not useaconinon currency, at least since
the early 1960s, The rules of Bretton Woodspermitted excursionsof up
tothree percent between any two European currencies.4 Such excursions
were big enough to interfere with the functioning of the cereals market.
The problem precipitated in 1969, with the August devaluation of the
The rules set one percent margins around the dollar parity of each
currency,thus in principle permittingbilateralexcursions of up to 4
percent. European countries however had agreed to maintain their
dollar parities within smaller margins: 0.75 percent.8
French franc, and the (tober revaluation of the Deutsche mark. The
response to the realignments was the temporary suspensionof the free
cereals market. France prevented a jnp of cereals' prices on the home
market by converting the comeon ECU price at an artificial exchange
rate--that did not reflect the devaluation. Germany avoided being
flooded withFrench cereals by imposinga tariff onimportsand granting
anexport subsidy to itsown farm"rs. Afterthe fall of Bretton Woods,
responding to realignments with theintroduction of tariffs and
subsidiesbecame coninon practice. By 1974 a German farmer exporting
butter to Italy received a subsidy equal to 28.3 percent of the price;
if the butter was shipped the other way, a corresponding tax was levied
on the Italian exporter.
Beyond infringingthe basicprincipleon whichtheEECwasset up,
the tariffsandsubsidies introducedtocope with realignments havealso
beencostlyfor the EECbudget. Fortwo reasons.Thefirst is that it
proved easier to remove the tariffs byletting agricultural prices rise
inthe aevaluing country, thantoremovethesubsidies by cutting prices
inthe revaluing country. Therefore the revenue from the tariffs did
not match the expenditure on the subsidies. The persistence of export
subsidies in strong—currency countries aggravated 'schronic
overproductionof food. By the mid-1970's two thirds of the financial
resources available to the EEC were absorbed by the cost of running the
agriculturalmarket-—leavingvery little room foractionin other areas.
Exchange ratestability then became a vital issue for theEEC, and
it thus natural that the Coniuission would become a strong supporter of
schemes designed to limit intra-European exchange rate fluctuations.9
The problem has riot disappeared in the .The"agri-monetary"
consequences of a realignment are an important item in the negotiations,
as documented by the realignment Coiuiuniques that always carefully spell
out the provisions for agricultural markets--the timing of price
adjustments, etc.
For many years the conon agrictLLtural policy has been the only
-important activity of the EECandthe main reason for its existence. In
the early 1970's the agricultural market absorbed 90 percent of the
total EEC budget; in 1985 the figure was still as high as 73 percent.
It is unlikely that the EEC would still be there had it failed to keep
the cownon agricultural market alive.• Over the years the operation of
the agricultural market provided the testing ground for cooperation in
other areas. The EEC is now moving in new directions. The planned
liberalization of 1992 is its first major initiative outside of
agriculture: if succesfull it will reduce the importance of agriculture
among the activities of the EEC and enhance the role of this institution
in the coordination of economic policies across Europe. To some extent
the evolution of the EEC has been possible because this institutions
survived the difficulties of operating the cereals market. Exchange
rate stability has thus been an important condition for institutional
developuents in Europe.
Trying to understand the E without considering the grounds for
the European aversion to exchange rate fluctuations would be
misleading. For the countries that belong to the leaving the system
is a step that many would associate with the abandonment of other areas
of European cooperation as well. In some crucial occasions, the links10
between the and other institutions of European cooperation has been
instiunental to force policy shifts that in turn have made the survival
of the exchange—rate system possible.
3. The RIS is an (Imperfect) Greater Deutsche-Mark Area
Ten years of operations of the R provide an important case stty.
to those who are interested in designing new forms of international
monetary policy coordination. In any fixed-exchange-rates regime, the
task of running monetary policy is not explicitly assigned to any one
country. Supporters of the hypothesis that international monetary
policy coordination is feasible, claim that in cocjnodity standard
systems like the gold standard or the Bretton Woods regime, the
establishment of nominal parities in terms of an external nuneraire
forced all countries to pursue the nominal target in a syninetric
fashion. This mechanism, it is claimed, imposes a sort of implicit
coordination of monetary policies. In a fiat currency system like the
ENS, systematic cooperation by monetary authorities could help to define
coiiinon monetary targets, to be pursued jointly by all countries.
Are the use of an external ntmieraire——like gold in the earlier
fixed-exchange—rates regimes--or the institution of consultation bodies-
-like the EEC Monetary Cotmiitte and the Comitte of Central Bank
Governors——effective enough measures to induce international monetary
policy cooperation? The evidence from the ENS suggests a negative
answer to that question. The ENS, like the gold standard and the
Bretton Woods system, is characterized by a "center" country——West11
Germany--whose central bank pursues its own monetary targets
independently of the policies pursued by the other members.5 The other
countries, which have——to a significant extent——converged to West
Germany's monetary policies, have maintained limited independence by the
systematic use of capital controls, and the adoption of periodic
exchange—rate devaluations.
The strongest evidence in support of the hypothesis that the E1S
actually worked as some imperfect Greater Deutsche—Mark Area comes from
the study of interest rates: West German interest rates are unaffected
by most intra-EIIS shocks, like the expectations of parity realignments,
while interest rates denominated in the other currencies are those that
suffer the full impact of intra—EIIS portfolio disturbances. Countries
like Italy and France have prevented the wide fluctuations in their own
interest tes observed in the (unregulated) Euro-markets to affect
their domestic economies by imposing capital controls. This evidence,
as Giovannini [1988] shows, is similar to that of the gold standard and
the Bretton Woods period, when countries other than Great Britain and
the United States, respectively, sought to defend their policies from
the influence of the "center" country by imposing various forms of
regulatory hurdles on the international transmission of monetary
See Giovannini (1988] for an historical comparison of the gold
standard, Bretton Woods and the E, a formal statement of the




One ofthe most dramatic changes in the economies of the member
countriessince 1979 has been the decrease in the rate of inflation.
Table I compares inflation rates of various European countries at the
start of the E2 with the present. The table suggests both a
significant convergence of European inflation rates towardstheWest
German levels, and a general decrease of inflation, which is not limited
to the countries belonging to the .Sincethe conclusion of the
precedingsectionis thatWestGermany'smonetary policyha-sbeen atthe
centerofthe ,andsince West German authorities built a wide
reputationas inflation fighters" in the secondpostwarperiod, the
natural question raised by this experience is whether the structure and
working of the RIS, and in particular the central role played by the
Germanmonetaryauthorities,have played anyrolein thedisinflation
experienceof countries as different as Denmark, France andItaly. In
this section we review the argument accordirg to which peggingthe
exchange rate canhelpa country in the disinflation effort, and present
6In the form of changes in regulations affecting the gold market, and
controlson international capital flows.13
the evidence for a nunber of fl countries, and a country outside the
: the United Kingdcm. The theoretical model points to the problem of
the crethbility of the exchange rate target, and the costs of the
exchange rate union for the center country——West Germany. In our
empirical analysis we attempt to measure both the credibility of intra-
European exchange rate targets, and the size, timing, and effects of
shifts in expectations after 1979.
4.1 Breaking the Inflation Inertia: The Role of Expectations
One fundamental feature of the inflationary process in modern
industrial economies appears to be its persistence, a phenomenon that
has been linked to the mechanics of wage and price setting. Firms and
unions—- for a number of reasons that we do not need to explore here7——
find it more convenient to set prices and wages much less frequently
than the rate of arrival of economic news. Therefore wages and prices
are crucially affected by workers' and firms' expectations. Workers and
firms are concerned, for example, to preserve the purchasing power of
their income, and incorporate in their output prices their forecasts of
the future evolution of the general price level. Indirectly, wage and
price setters concerned about the evolution of the general price level
need to forecast stance of monetary policy.
The special nature of wage and price setting therefore creates a
See, for example, Blanchard (1988) and Roteinberg [1988) for excellent
Surveys.14
problem of coordination between the central bank and the public.The
central. bankmight wantto use monetary policy to steer the economy
towards ahigher output path, but the public, anticipating future
expansionarY policies, can sterilize them fully, by incorporating in
their current pricing decisions the expectation of future monetary
expansion and higher inflation. This process, by.itself, generates
inflation and tends to force the monetaryauthorityto accomodatethe
higherrate of growth of prices, in order to avoid a severe recession.
Hence in equilibrium there is higher inflation, and less output growth,
than initially desired by both the public and monetaryauthorities.
Thisis the inflationary bias of monefarypolicy in the presence of
price and wage inertia, first described and analyzed by Barro and Gordon
(19831.
The coordination problem of of monetary policy and sluggish prices
and wages is also at the core of the issue of disinflation. Bringing
inflation down requires a change in inflationary expectations on the
part of price setters. How can the monetary authorities "convince"
price setters thatanannouncedcontractionwill be lasting and
credible?The reputation that a central bank needs to bring down
inflation can be obtained intwo ways. The first, and more painful
method for society as a whole, is by showing that,even in the worst of
adepression, theannouncedmonetary targets arenot reneged. The
initial monetarycontraction after the announcement of a disinflation
plangenerates a recession, since it is imposed in a economy where
inflation and money growth expectations are high. The recession would
tend to be longer and harsher, the slower is the response of the private15
sector expectation to the monetaryrac, because the very fact
thatthe monetaryauthority sticks to the announced contractionary path
comes to private agents as a surprise.
Alternatively, the monetary authoritycould avoid going through
this prolonged"initiation" period by seeking a way toinfluence
expectationswith some institutional reform. The institutional reform
of interest for us is a change in the exchange rate regime. How can the
transition from flexible to fixed exchange rates bring about an
improvement in the output-inflation tradeoff, and facilitate the
disinflation effort? Under fixed exchange rates, a central bank tends
to loose control on the domestic supply of money, since the changes in
international reserves needed to support the exchange rate parity
produce changes in the domestic supply of money which, in principle, the
monetary authoritycannotinfluence.
Now,suppose a country decides to passively peg its exchange rate
to another country, whose monetary authority enjoys the reputation of
being an inflation-buster. By "passive peg" we mean that the former
country' s monetary authority, after announcing the exchange—rate parity,
simply accornodates the latter country's monetary policies, without any
attemptto directly influence their choice of targets.What happens to
theinflation expectationsofthe private sector? Wageand price
setters need to evaluatethecredibility of this institutionalreform,
that is they need to determine the likelihood that the announced
exchangerate targets will be pursuedconsistently. If, and onlyif,
the exchange—rate target is a credible one, expectations will adjustand
theprocess of disinflation will be facilitated.16
In practice, the E' has not completely eliminated inflation
differentials. Countries with higher inflation rates have resorted to
periodicexchange—rate realignments to recover the losses in
competitiveness caused by persisting inflation differentials and fixed
exchange rates. The disruptions caused by speculators' expectations of
these exchange— rate realignments have been limited——as we stressed
above——through the systematic use of capital controls. Even when the
exchange i-ate are periodically realigned, though, pegging to a low
inflation country can improve the output-inflat:tradeoff. This
happens because the terms-of-trade fluctuations that occur during the
intervals when exchange rates are not changed provide a strong-enough
deterrent to central banks not th deviate from the center—country
monetary policies as much as they would under a pure floating rate
regime. With periodic realignments, however, the center country's
output-inflationtradeoffis affected as well. During the intervals
when exchange rates are kept fixed, the center country's terms of trade
worsen, because the partner's inflation rate is higher than its own.As
a consequence, the center-country's output—inflation tradeoff also
worsens: the inflation-buster exports reputation and imports inflation.
In summary, the argument that pegging to West Germany hashelped
highinflation countries in the disinflation effortsof the 1980s rests
cruciallyon the assumption that exchange-rate targets are more credible
thanmonetary targets. In the next section we try to measure the effects
ofthe EMS oninflation expectations and the short-run output-inflation
tradeoff among member countries, and confront the issue of credibility
of exchange-rate targets.17
4.2Measuring the Shifts in Expectations
Our discussion in the previous section suggests that one important
macroeconomic benefit of the EMS for countries other than West Germany
could have been associated with a shift in inflationary expectations
originating from the public's awareness that in a fixed-exchange-rate
regime like the EMS monetary policy is run, by and large, by the
Bundesbank.Inorder to asses the empirical relevance of these effects,
weneed to measure these shifts of expectations. Consider the dynamics
of wages and prices. As we argued above, private agents (firms and
unions) set prices and wages by forming expectations on future
macroeconomic variables, like the overall rate of inflation. These
expectations are necessarily a function of agents' available
information, reflected in current and .st realization of all relevant
macroeconomic variables. If amonetary reform like the EMS is put in
place,private agents who believe thatthereform will actually change
monetarypolicies inthe waydescribed above, have to reevaluate the
methodsthey use to extrapolate from past macroeconomic variables their
expectations about future inflation and economic activity. Hence the
shift in expectations, and its effect on the inflationary process, will
be reflected in a shift of statistical equations relating wages and
prices to available information. In this section we study the process
of disinflation in Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and, for
comparison, the United Kingdom, by comparing how the relation between
price and wage inflation and output has shifted after the start of the18 .Weare concernedbothwith the timing of the shifts, arid with
their magnitude.
Weestimate a (quarterly) system of three equations specifying the
dynamics of CPIinflation,wage inflation, and output growth, which we
measure using industrial production indices. Each equation includes on
the right hand side a time trend, seasonal dunmy variables, 4 lags of
wageinflation,CPI inflation and industrial production growth, and
dumy variables representing country-specific events that the model
cannot explain.8 We also include 4 lags of Ml growth rates, as well as
changes in the relative price of imported intermediate and final goods.
This last set of variables are assumed to be determined outside of the
system: while innovations in wage and price inflation are plausibly
correlated with money growth and changes in relative prices of
intermediate and final goods, these variables are assumed to affect
inflation and output growth only with a one—quarter lag
The first question we address is whether there is evidence of a
significantshift in these statistical equationsafter 1979. Atestof
stabilityof the mrameter estimates wasperformed for each equation and
8The duisiies are the following. For all countries,from 1971:3 to the
endofthe sample, fall of the fixed—rates regime. For Italy,69:2-
70:1 Autunno Caldo, 73:3—74:1 price freeze. For France, 63:4-64:4,
69:1—70:4, 74:1—74:4, 77:1—77:4, 82:3—83:4, wageandprice controls;
68:2-68:3 "May1968'.For the UK, 67:4 sterling devaluation, 73:4-
74:4 wagecontrols.
Theestimates are obtained assuming that superneutralityholds, i.e.
thesum of the coefficients of nominal variables is equal to I in the
equations explaining wage and price inflation, and is zero in the
equation explaining output growth. These constraints were not
rejected in the largest majority of cases.19
eachcositry, using asa cutting point the first quarter of 1979. The
results of the test indicate the presence of a structural shift only in
the case of France: in no other country the shifts of wage-price
dynamicsafter 1979are statistically significant. While this evidence
is against the hypothesis that the E4Shasbeen associated with a shift
in expectations, the negative result is very likely to be caused by the
lowpower of the parameter stability tests we employ.
The next question we address regards the timing and the direction
of the shifts in the inflation processes. Using parameter estimates
obtained over the 60-79 sample, and theactualrealizationsof the
forcingvariables (money growth and relative prices of intermediate and
finalgoods) we compute dynamic simulations of wageand price inflation
and output growth. Table 2reports the timing and the direction of
estimatedshifts in inflation and output dynamics obtained from the
simulations. For every country we show the date whenthe simulated
paths of inflation and output growth start diverging in a persistent way
from the actualpaths,andthesign of the divergence. The words
"higherand "lower" reported in parenthesis under each date indicate
that the actual realizations of the variables were respectively higher
andlower than their simulated values.
The table shows a number of impressive regularities. First, for
all countries except West Germany,and possiblyDenmark,actualand
10InGiavazzi and Giovannini (forthcomi.ngl we reportamore detailed
analysis of the model, and all the statistical results. Detailed
statistics for Ireland, which do not appear there, are available from
us on request.20
simulatedinflation and output paths start diverging later than the
beginning of the .Second,simulations for output growth tend to be
less clearcutthansimulations for inflation. And third, the direction
of the divergences are opposite for Germany and the other countries in
the table. In Germany actual inflation after 1979 is higher than its
simulated value, and output growth is lower. The opposite results of
Germany and the other countries are consistent with the model of
imported reputation. The delayed shifts in the output-inflation
tradeoffs for most countries, which occur well after the start of the ,andthe very similar pattern followed by UK inflation and output,
raise the question of the nature of the shift in expectation, and the
role played by the reform of the exchange-rate regime.
Further evidence on the effects of the exchange—rate reform on
expectations is reported in figures 1 to 3, which depict the Euro-
interest—rate differentials between3—monthkroner, franc and lire
deposits andDeutsche-mark deposits. Interest-rate differentials
containboth expectations of exchange rates and risk premia. The
presumption is that,ifexchange rate targets were perfectly credible,
both components of the interest rate differentials would tend to zero:
expected changes in exchange rates would disappear, and the
substitutability between eurodeposits denominated in francs, marks,
liras and kroner--which is presunably inversely related to risk premia--
would increase. The figures, by contrast, show that interest-rate
differentials are not stabilized after 1979. In particular, the years
1982 and 1983 are associated with a crisis of confidence in the E1S, as
shown by the large increases in interest-rate differentials.21
In s*muary, the evidence from the simulation of the output-
inflation model suggest a delayed response in expectations, while
interest rate differentials indicate that expectations and risk premia
did not decrease after the start of the EMS. Is this evidence
consistent with the theory? The failure of interest-rate differentials
todisappearisclearly not enough to dismiss the imported-credibility
model. Although higher interest rates on lira, franc, andkioner
deposits most likely indicate that private agents attached a positive
probability to devaluations of these currencies relati.e to the Deutsche
mark,European countrieswere subject to the effects of the
unprecedented dollar appreciation in the early eighties and the second
oil shock: the exchange rate mechanism might have limited the expected
devaluations relative to a pure floating regime. Hence, while the
forward exchange rates data seem to be inconclusive on the issue of the
credibility of the exchange-rate targets, there is no prima-facie
inconsistency between the simulation results and the behavior of forward
premia.
Finally, we turn to the analysis of the magnitudes of the shifts in
the output-inflation tradeoffs. Table 3reports changes ininflation
and cumulative output growth that occurred inEuropeancountries since
1979, and comperes them with simulations of the same magnitudes obtained
from the model describedabove. Contrast, for example, the experiences
ofGermany, Ireland and Italy. According to our s imulat ions, every
percentage point of inflation reduction since 1979 would have afforded
Geriiny 10.7 percent growth: by contrast, the output growth for every
point of inflation reductionwas only 4.10.In the case of Ireland and22
Italy, our simulations predict that every point of inflation reduction
could have afforded thosecountries4.10 and 0.67 percent growth,
respectively. But in reality, real growth for every point of inflation
reduction was higher in both cases: 6.94 percent in Ireland and 2. 18
percent in Italy. Similarly, our simulations predicted a fall in output
by 1.34 percentfor every percent point reduction of inflation in
Denirk,whereas infact output hasincreased by 10.6 percent forevery
percent point reduction of inflation. These comparisons vividly
illustratethe estimated effects of shifts in expectations, and their
uneven distribution among Germany and theEuropean partners.
It ishowever puzzling that price andwage expectationsseem to
have adjustedwitha lag. One possible interpretationof this puzzle is
that the effects of the 1S on expectations were not as direct as
predicted by the Barro-Gordonmodel. Theexperience in France, Italy
and Ireland, and our estimates of the timing of the shifts in
expectations, suggesl that the shifts in expectations were prompted by
shiftsindomestic policies.
In Italy we estimate a shift in expectations in the first quarter
of 1985, in the aftermath of a government decree which had set a ceiling
on wage indexation.Thatdecreehad beenchallenged by the unions, and
waseveentually ratified by a national referendum, in June 1984.
InIreland there wasa major turnaround in economic policies in the
Suner of1982, marked byan announcementof tighter guidelines for
monetary policy, a decision of not to devalue the central parity of the
puntinthe February and June 1982 R realignments, and to freeze pay23
increases in the public sector.'
Inranc, the turnaround in macroeconomic policies occurs in March
1983, after the expansionary experiment of the first Mitterand
government had produced a large current account deficit (3.5 percent of
GDP) and a speculative attack on the franc. The government accompanied
the EMS exchange realignment with a freeze in budgetary expenses, an
12 increase in income taxes, and a dramatic tightenin of credit.
What was the linkage bett.ieen these policies and the EMS constraint?
In the case of Ireland and France the linkage is apparent. In
particular, French authorities justified the unpopular policies as a
necessary step to insure E membership, and linked the membership in
the EMS to the participation in the c.13Inthe case of Italy, we
were unable to find any important reference to the in the government
pronouncements after the decree on wage indexation, but cannot exclude
that the external constraint might have motivated that unpopular policy.
In conclusion, membership might have helped countries other than
West Germany in their disinflation efforts only to the extent that they
provided a justification for unpopular policies vis-a'-vis the domestic
public, which could have helped to strengthen the credibility of the
exchange-rate targets. The unpopular policies were justified, by French







5. The "European Alliance"
Theview of the Fas asystem designedtoenhance the credibility
of inflation—pronecountries leaves us with a puzzle. What incentives
doesGermany have to belongtosuchasystem? The imported credibility
model suggests that the center country may be the loser in an agreement
in which it provides the nominal anchor that helps its parnthrs to
dis inflate. If the dec is ion to peg to a stable currency produced an
instanteneous adjustmentofexpectations, the center countrywouldbe
unaffected by the decisions of others to peg to its currency. But if
learning takes time and disinflationis a dynamic process, duringthe
transition the terms of trade of the center countryworsen,and so does
its output-inflationtradeoff.Theseeffects are obviously smaller te
larger is the center country relative to its partners: the United States
were not concernedwhenGrenada or Belize decided to peg to the dollar.
Butevenifwe consider Germanyand the Netherlandsa de-facto iaonetary
unionand we stmi their economic size, the joint GDP of the two countries
(one thousand billion ECUs in 1985) is still only two—thirds of the
joint GDPoftheothermembers of the RIS.TheE!Sareaalso accounts
for some 30 percent of total German and Dutch trade.
The empirical results described in section 4.2 seem to confirm that
Germany'soutput-inflationtradeoff worsened sinceth start of the 1S.
The evidence would thus justify the initial reluctance of the Deutsche
Bundesbanktojoin the system. It temajns to explain, however, why
German policymakers tried, since the late 1960s, to avoid an
uncoordinated response of European countries to the fall of Bretton25
Woods.As itbecameclear that the Bretton Woods system was approaching
its final days, German policymakers became increasingly worried that
other European currencies might riot be able to follow the appreciation
of the Ctl vis-a-ViS the dollar: they were preoccupied that the
realignement of intra-European parities would disrupt the European
customs union as well as the coninon agricultural market-—two
institutions that they considered important for the Germaneconomy.14
Inthis section we look for evidence of Germany'sincentivesto
stay in the E analyzing the behavior of Germany'sterms-of-tradefrom
the Bretton Woods era tothe 1980s. The terms-of-trade index we useis
thereal effective exchange rate of the Deutsche mark built using
relative wholesale prices and the fllF-MER?1 weights, that are designedto
measurea country's competitiveness relative to its trading parthers.
We are interested in finding out whether thehas stabilized
Germany's terms of trade relative to previous periods.
Thedefinition of "stability", however, is not unambiguous. One
possibiityis to look at the variability of unanticipated changes in the
real effective exchange rate. Thismeasure however eliminates most of
thelow frequency component of the series. Indeed, itcould be argued
that those low—frequency components are worthy of special attention.
Williamson(1983] suggests that while exchange rate volatility (measured
by the standarddeviationof unanticipated exchange rate changes) might
havea negative impact ontrade andwelfare,exchange rate misalignment
14For an account of the German position in those years see Emiriger
[1977]and Kloten[1978].26
(that is prolonged deviationsof the exchange rate from somefundamental
level)arelikely to bring about the largest costs.15Table 4 reports
the simplest possible measure of the variability of the real effective
excange rate: its standard deviation. The data are monthly, from 1960
to 1985. The volatility of the effective real rate increases
dramatically after the end of Bretton Woods, but stabilizes in the EMS.
The secondeolinnn in the Table suggests why this might have happened.
We construct the real effective exchange rate of' the Deutsche mark vis-
a'—vis its parthers and compute the correlation between the index of
"global" competitiveness and that of Germany's competitivenessinside
theEMS.In the 1960s and '70s the correlation betweenthe two indices
is very high, indicating that the French franc, the lira and the other
EI currencies did not follow the Deutsche mark—-particularly at the
time of its largeappreciation vis-a'—vis the dollar, after the collapse
ofBretton Woods. Thephenomenon reverses after 1979: the correlation
between the global andtheintra—ENS indices becomesnegativeindicating
thatthe ENS has limited the effects of the fluctuations of the
dollar/tN rate on Germany's competitiveness. Similar computations for
the other EMS countries show that the phenomenon documented in Table 4
is specific to Germany. Belgium for example offers the mirror image of
the German experience: the correlation between the global and the intra-
15Recentresearch byKrugman and Baldwin (1987], Baldwin and Krugxnan
[1986],Dixit [1987], and especially Krunan (1988], provides the
firstattemptat formalizing the linkage between the uncertainty and
slow mean—reversion in exchange rate movements and the speed of
adjustment of intersectoral factor movements and investment.27
indices increases after 1979. Given that Belgium is one of
Germany's major trading parthers,this hasstabilized Germany's real
exchange rate. The cost for Belgium has been an increase in the
volatility of real effective exchange rate.
The evidence on Germany's terms—of-trade seems to support the
"European Alliance" view of the R: the system has protected Germany
from the effects of dollar fluctuations. In the early 1970s, at the
time ofthe first dollar collapse, Germanyappreciated both vis-a'-vis
the dollar andvis-a' -vis its Europeanpartners:the resultwasa large
swingin the country terms-of-trade. After the dollar fall of 1985 the
E9Scurrenciesfollowed e DM much closer and attenuated the impact on
Germany'sterms-of-trade. The comparison between the two periods
clearly shows the extent to which thehas stabilized Germany's
overall competitiveness. From November 1969 to March 1973 the Deutsche
mark appreciated 25 percent vis-a'-vis the dollar; this was accompanied
by an 18.6 percent worsening ofGermany'soverall competitiveness.From
January 1985to December1987 the DM appreciation was similar-—27
percent--but thistimeitwas accompaniedby a loss of competitivenes
only half as large-—9 percent.
6. Fiscal implications of monetary convergence.
Ourdiscussion of the European disinflation has so far neglec:ed
the fiscal implications of monetary convergence. The important
interactions between inflation and the financing of budget deficoç n
up an additional setof issues on the economiceffects oftheE. anc28
theprospects of financial markets liberalization plannedfor1992.
Whathas been theeffect of the convergence of inflation rates on the
governmentdebt in the high inflation countries? There are two channels
through which a disinflation affects the budget. The firstisdirect: a
monetary contraction reduces the portion of the budget deficit that can
be financed by printing money. The second channel stems from the rise
in real interest rates andthe fall in output associated with the
disinflation. When the gap between thereal rate and the growth rate
widens,debt startstogrow. The larger a country's initial stock of
publicdebt-—as a percent of GDP——the more serious will be the impoct on
thebudget of any increase in the real rate and of any reduction in the
rateof growth.
Alltheseproblems areparticularly important inEuropebecause
highdebt levels and dependence on money financingwerethe norm in many
countries beforethestart of the E1S. Table 5 shows the fiscal
situation of Ireland, Italy, DenmarkandBelgium before the start of the
E. We concentrate on these countries, neglecting France, Germany and
theNetherlands, because the latter were characterized neither by high
debt levels, nor by significant money financing--and not surprising it
is the first four countries that eventualy developed a fiscal problem.
In 1978 none of these countries, with the possible exception of Belgium.
could be characterized as facing a dramatic fiscal problem. Ireland and
Italy had a high debt ratio and a primary deficit that exceeded the
revenue from money financing, but real rates were well below the growth
rate of income, and the ratio of debt to GDP was stable. Denmark had a
smallprimary surplusand a large revenue from money financing: the sum29
ofthe two was more thanenoughto service the debt,evenathighreal
rates.Belgitmi is the only comtry where debt was growing.
To analyse the effects of inflation convergence on debt and
deficits, we need to isolate the components of government deficits, and





The increaseinthe stockofgovernment debt, B, equalsthe capitalized
value of last period's debt, less the increase in credit to the
government by the central bank (Ct_Cti), plusthe non—interest (or
primary)budget deficit. Bt and Cdenote stocksof credit at the end
of period t, i is the interest rate on government borrowing, from the
end of period t—1 to the end of period t. Dividing both sides of the
equation by nominal income at time t, Y, and applying the usual
approximations, we obtain:
b -bi(rti_nt_j)bt_i + d -(c_ci)-(lTt+nti)cti(2)
wherelowercase letters denote the corresponding variables in uppercase
letters expressed as percent of Q'P. Equation (2) says that the
increase in government debt is higher, the higher the real interest
burden on the existing stock of debt--measured by the real interest rate
in excess of the rate of growth ofthe economy—-andthehigher the
primary deficit. An alternative means of financing deficits is
represented by the last two terms on the right hand side of equation30
(2): the increase of credit to the government by the central bank (in
percentof(?JP), seigniorage and the inflation tax. Seigniorage is
represented by n_1c_1, i.e. the non-inflationary growth of the total
stock of credit from the central bank. The inflation tax (in percent of
(24P) is ITtCtI.
In the steady state, barring nonneutralities of the tax system,
the only fiscal consequence of a slo1own in the rate of inflation is
the change in seignorage revenue and in the inflation tax. If the
economy is along the efficient portion of the revenue curve, both
seignorageandtheinflation tax fall.Thus a country that prior to the
disinflation relied on seignorageandonthe inflation tax as a source
ofrevenue must sooner or later correct its primary deficit. If the
country could simply jump from the high to the low-inflation steady
stateand the fiscal correction occured simultaneously with the jump in
inflation, the debt level would be unaffected by the change in monetary
regime. But if the country postpones the fiscal correction, debt grows:
the longer the postponement, the larger becomes the change in the
primary deficit required to stabilize the debt, because in the meantime
the stock of debt has grown.
The response of European fiscal authorities to the revenue loss
induced by the distnflation was uneven. Denmark and Irelandswifitly
turned the primary deficit into a large surplus; Italywaited.The
question thus arises of what is the cost of waiting.How fastdoes the
requiredchange in the primary deficit grow if you delay the fiscal
correction? Figure 4 helps artswêringthisquestion. On the vertical
and on the horizontal axis we have the primary deficit andthedebt31
level respectively. The two downward sloping schedules describe steady
states in which the ratio of public debt to GDPisconstant. They are
drawn for two different levels of (s+n)c, the steady state revenue from
money financing in equation (2). Money financing is higher along the
upper schedule than it is along the lower one. The slope of the two
schedules is -(r-n): if the interest rate is above the growth rate of
income a higher debt level requires a smaller primary deficit. As Cr-n)
becomes smaller, the schedules. flatten out, since the cost of sustaining
higher debt levels also becomes smaller.
Considernowa country starting off from a point such as A, and
assane that inlationjumpstozero, so thatit loosesall the revenue
from the inflation tax. If the fiscal authorities correct the budget
iunediately, the country simply moves from A to B at anunchanged stock
of debt. But ifthefiscal correction is delayed, the economystarts
drifting fromAtowards a point such asA'.How fast does therequired
fiscal correction grow? The difference between the budget correction
required inAandinA'is(r-n) times the increase in the stock of
debt: i.e therequiredfiscal correction grows at (r-n).
Suppose a country starts off withaseventyfive percent ratio of
public debt to GDP, andaprimary deficit equalto2percentof GDP.
Assumethatprior to the disinflation money financing brought 3.5
percentof GDPeachyear in the coffers of the Treasury, and that Cr-n)
is equal to 0.02. If the fiscal correction is done ixunediately, it must
fully offset the loss in money financing: if this falls to zero the
primary deficit must move from a 2 percent deficit to a surplus of 1.532
percent.
16If the fiscal correction does not takeplace,ten years
later the debt level will have grown frow50to 90 percent of GDP, but
thefiscal correction required to stabilize it will have grownonlyfrom
1.5to 1.8 percent of GDP.
This simple example suggests that, if policymakers' public support
is negatively affected by a fiscal contraction, there is a strong
incentive to wait. A delay in fiscal adjustment increases the chances
of reelection of the current government. Come tomorrow, the fiscal
contraction- -and the accompanying loss of consensus--will be only
slightly higher. Waiting can be very attractive.
The output response to the monetary contraction and to the
turnaround in fiscal policy adds further effects on the dynamics of the
stabilization. As discussed in section 3, the decision to peg to a
stable currency does not produce an instantaneous shift in expectations:
thus, the impact effect of the central bank's decision to embark on a
newmonetarypath, consistent with the peg, is an increase in real
interest rates. The rise in interest rates will depress output, o that
during the transition (r-n) will be higher: this is the secondary burden
of the disinflation. In addition, lower output will reduce tax revenues
and add a cyclical component to the primary deficit. If on top of this
the primary deficit is abruptly cut, it is unclear whether the simple
jumpfrom Ato B described in figure 1 is at all possible.
In Table 6 we show the results of simple simulations designed to
16 . . Inreality, even if inflation falls to zero, not all money financing
will be lost. At n0 money financing is equal to nc.33
capture the dynamics of debt in the presence of a responseof output,
real rates and the budget to the monetary contraction. Lines 1>, 2) and
3) illustrate the example discussed above. 2) and 3) correspond,
respectively, to the instanteneous fiscal correction and to the case
when the correction comes ten years later. The simulation reported on
line 4) allows for a temporary increase in (r—n), which jumps from 2 to
3 percent at the outset of the disinflation and than gradually falls
back to 2 percent17 The fiscal correction occurs, as in case 3) after
ten years. Line 5) extends the example by including the effect of the
recession on the budget. The recession is assumed to worsen the budget
by an amount equal to 3.5 percent of GDPinthe first year, which
gradually returns to zero in six years.
The results of these simulations suggest that the effects of the
monetary convergence on the government debt of some B' members has been
sizeable, and could malce the fiscal situation of countries like Italy
and Ireland more and more difficult to manage. Such convergence is
however necessary to achieve a sustainable elimination of inflation rate
differentials.
17
The precise figure areshownon the bottom of the Table.34
7.Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have reviewed the experience of the E to
identify the lessons that this experiment inmonetarycoordination could
provide to those who are considering a reform of the international
monetary system.
Clearly,an institution like the would not work outside of
Europe,fora numberofreasons.First,the incentives thatcountries
have to belongtothe E1S--the high degree of integration of European
economies, and the more comprehensive design of institutional
integration of which the EMS is justanelement, andwhichlends
credibilityto the EMSexchange—ratet.argets-—are not present, say,
amongthe US, Europe and Japan. Second, the operation of monetary
policies has not been linked tothe exchange-rateconstraintby all
countries:West Germany appears to have pursued its own monetary
targets without attempting to accomodate international influences, while
the other countries have either accomodated Germany's policies, or
changed exchange rates, or imposed capital controls. The striking
similarity between the EMS and previous experiences of fixed exchange
rates suggests that the institution of fixed rates cannot per se, induce
international monetary policy cooperation. Finally, the differences in
the the use of the inflation tax among European countries and the
divergent behavior of government debt after 1979 indicate that the
pursuitof monetaryconvergenceamongcountries with different fiscal
structures might entail substantial fiscal reforms.35
Table1
The European disinflation












The timing anddirection of the shift in expectations:
Denmark France GermanyIrelandItalyU.Kingdom
Price
Inflation 80:1 83:2 79:2 82:3 85:1* 81:3
(direction) (lower) (lower) (higher) (lower) (lower ) (lower)
Wage
Inflation 80:2 83:2 79:2 80:2 85:1 81:1
(direction) (lower) (lower) (higher) (lower) (lower ) (lower)
OutputGrowth80:3 none 79:2 none none none
(direction) (higher) (lower)
Note: The words "higher' and "lower" indicate that the actual realization of
the variables arerespectivelyhigher andlowerthantheirsimulated values.
The word"none" indicates that nosystematic divergence betweenactualand
simulated values can be detected. In the case of Italy the divergence between
actualand simulated variables occurs close to the end of the simulation period37
Table3
The shift in the output-inflation tradeoff
DenmarkFranceGermanyIrelandItalyU.Kingdom
Endof the
Simulations 84:4 85:4 86:4 88:1 86:4 87:1
Changein
Inflation —1.83 —4.86 —3.37 —9.72 —8.38 —6.23
Predicted
Change in
Inflation —2.57 6.78 —5.51 —8.57 —12.87 6.63
Cumulative
Changein




Output —3.45 26.18 58.95 59.60 8.25 9.9838
Table4
Germany'sTerms-of-Trade
StandardError ofthe Correlation between
Real Effective ExchangeRate the Global and the Intra-EEC





Sources: IMF, IFS. Realexchange rates are constructed usingwholesale prices.
Effective exchange-rate weigts are the fllF-MERII weights for 1977, normalized to
accot for Germany's competitiveness vis-a'-vis its eight major trading
parthers——in the case of the global index--and its four major EIIS parriers--in
thecaseof the intra-E?IS index. Weights are as follows. Global index:
Belgitmi, 0.0588; France, 0.2016; Italy, 0.151; Japan, 0.152; Netherlands, 0.074;
Switzerland, 0.043; United Kingdom, 0.058; United States, 0.262. Intra-E29S
index: Belgium, 0.121; France, 0.416; Italy, 0.311; Netherlands, 0.152.39
Table 5
Fiscalconditionsat the start of the E9S
(percentof GDP: 1978)
debt level money money financing r ft-n)
financingplus primary surplus
Belgium 0.65 0.0 —2.0 3.0 0.0
Ireland 0.82 1.8 —3.5 -0.6 —7.8
Italy 0.51 2.2 —2.2 —2.4 —5.1
Denmark 0.18 3.4 +5.2 4.0
Definitions:
Debtlevel is the stock ofpublic debt on themarket,i.e. total debt net of
debtheld by the centralbank. Money financing correspondsto the public sector
borrowingrequirement financed bythe central bank. Primary surplusisthe
budget deficit net of interest. r is the ex—post short-term real rate of
interest, and n is the growth rate of GD? at constant prices.
Sources: the fiscal variables for Ireland and Italy are from the localcentral
bank Bulletins. For Belgium and Denmarkdebtlevels arefromChourakietal.
[1986]; money financing and the debt held by the central bank arecomputed from
line12aof IFS. Interestratesand growth rates for all countries arefrom
European Economy.40
Table 6
Disinflation, debt and the budget
debt monetary budget surplus required
financing for debt stabilization
1) initial conditions 0.75 0.035 —0.020
2) instantaneous fiscal
correction 0.75 0.0 0.015
3) fiscal correction
after 10 years 0.91 0.0 0.018
4) fiscal correction
after 10 years




cyclical effects 1.20 0.0 0.024
In all simulations the steady state value of (r-n) is 0.02.In cases 2) and3)
the stabilization has no effect on real variables. In case4)output falls and
real rates rise duringthedisinflation, but there are no cyclical effects on







In case 5) ft-n) rises and the recession raises the budgetdeficit.The paths
of(r-n) and of the cyclical component of the budget are:
(r-n) cyclical
year1: 0.07 0.035
year 2: 0.07 0.035
year 3: 0.05 0.020
year 4: 0.04 0.010
year 5: 0.03 0.005
year 6: 0.02 0.041
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